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COLONEL  WILLIAM  PKESCOTT, 


THE   COMMANDER.  IN 


The  Battle  of  Bunker's  Hill. 


HONOR   TO   WHOM   HONOR   IS   DUE. 


A    MONOGRAPH, 

BY     FRANCIS     J.     PARKER 


BOSTON: 
A.     WILLIAMS     &     CO. 

:«:*    WASHINGTON   STKKET. 
1875. 


"HONOR    TO    WHOM    HONOR    IS    DUE." 


COLONEL  WILLIAM  PRESCOTT, 


THE   COMMANDER  IN 


The  Battle  of  Bunker's  Hill. 


HONOR   TO   WHOM   HONOR   IS   DUE. 


A    MONOGRAPH, 

BY     FRANCIS     J.     PARKER. 


BOSTON: 
A.     WIIJldlAMS     &     CO. 

28$  WARHI'NGVON  STREET.  ' 


To  ^e  Honorable  JOEL   PARKER,  LL.D. 

My  Dear  Judge : 

For  the  publication  of  this 

Monograph  you  are  as  much  responsible  as  I  am,  if 
not  more  so;  and  your  name  ought,  therefore,  to  accom 
pany  that  of 

Your  kinsman  and  friend, 

FRANCIS  J.  PARKER. 


PREFACE. 


"VJOTWITHSTANDING  the  several  discussions  respecting  the 
•f-^  action  at  Breed's  Hill  on  the  iyth  of  June,  1775;  its  origin, 
conduct,  and  command ;  the  contradictory  views  which  have  been 
and  are  yet  entertained  on  the  subject  of  the  battle,  would  seem 
to  permit,  if  they  do  not  require,  a  further  statement  relating  to 
it  —  particularly  as  to  who  was  the  commander  of  the  Provincial 
forces  engaged  on  that  day.  And  this  may  appropriately  fall  to 
the  lot  of  one  whose  ancestor  was  wounded  in  the  battle,  and  in 
whose  family  traditions  the  true  story  has  always  been  preserved. 

The  present  writer  has  seen  no  account  of  that  action  which 
dwelt  at  all  upon  what  has  appeared  to  him  a  most  important  ele 
ment  in  considering  the  question  of  command,  namely :  the  evident 
unexpectedness  on  the  part  of  all  the  American  authorities  of 
any  immediate  and  serious  engagement  as  the  result  of  Prescott's 
Expedition ;  while  it  seems  almost  beyond  doubt  that  Colonel 
Prescott,  whatever  may  have  been  the  original  intention  of  General 
Ward,  must  have  been  of  necessity  left  to  command  in  the  action ; 
for  its  occurrence  was  so  entirely  unforeseen,  and  the  crisis  came 
so  suddenly,  that,  when  it  came,  all  the  energies  of  all  the  author 
ities  were  bent  upon  sending  support  to  the  original  party ;  and 
if  any  thought  was  given  to  the  fact  that  the  commander  of  that 
party  was  not  a  general  officer,  it  was  outweighed  by  confidence 
in  Colonel  Prescott,  strengthened  perhaps  by  the  thought  which 


6 


in  our  day  has  crystalized  into  a  Presidential  proverb  about  swap 
ping  horses  while  crossing  a  stream. 

Whoever  writes  on  this  subject  will  do  well  to  receive  with 
caution  the  opinions  or  testimony  even  of  eye  witnesses  who  were 
engaged  in  the  controversies  of  the  first  quarter  of  the  present 
century,  and  especially  the  honestly  meant  but  utterly  unreliable 
statement  of  Colonel  Daniel  Putnam,  in  1825.  Convinced  that 
the  interval  of  forty  or  fifty  years  must  dim  the  memory  of  the 
soundest  mind,  even  if  the  cloud  which  always  comes  with  lapse 
of  time  is  not  made  thicker  by  the  mists  of  prejudice  or  contro 
versy,  I  have  preferred  to  rest  my  argument  almost  exclusively 
upon  contemporaneous  evidences.  The  dramatic  stories  of  the 
battle,  unheard  of  until  more  than  a  score  of  years  had  passed 
away,  are  piquant  additions  to  the  sedateness  of  history,  but  hardly 
reliable  as  authorities. 


BUNKER'S  HILL  BATTLE 

AND    ITS    COMMAND. 


BY  the  first  of  June,  1775, the  increasing  numbers  of  the  invest 
ing  forces,  and  their  improved  organization,  had  begun  to  create 
discomfort  in  Boston.  Every  avenue  except  that  by  sea  was 
absolutely  closed  to  supplies.  Cattle,  hay  and  fuel,  which  the 
British  supposed  to  be  safe  on  the  islands  in  the  harbor,  had  been 
captured  or  destroyed,  and  the  loss  of  them  was  severely  felt  - 
more  severely  because  of  recent  additions  to  the  numbers  of  the 
beleaguered  army,  requiring  an  increased  supply  of  food  and 
forage.  In  these  affairs  about  the  harbor  several  spirited  skir 
mishes  had  occurred  between  the  belligerents,  and  the  result  of 
them  had  been  to  give  the  Americans  confidence  in  themselves, 
and  to  make  the  royalists  more  uneasy  under  their  restriction. 
The  British  had  therefore  determined  to  occupy  the  Charlestown 
peninsula,  which  could  easily  be  defended  by  works  at  the  Neck, 
and  the  possession  of  which  would  give  them  considerable  grass 
and  pasture,  and  afford  them  another  opportunity  of  sallying  out 
by  land. 

Meantime  the  Committee  of  Safety,  the  Executive  of  Massa 
chusetts,  was  earnestly  pressing  for  a  more  vigorous  prosecution 
of  the  siege,  (i.)  without  much  consideration  of  the  lack  of  disci 
pline  or  organization  in  their  army,  or  the  scantiness  of  the  supply 
of  ammunition;  and,  incited  by  the  reported  intention  of  General 
Gage  to  occupy  Bunker's  Hill,  they  urged  General  Ward  —  the 
commander  of  their  own  and  the  New  Hampshire  forces — to 

1.  Journals  of  Provincial  Congress,  pp.  543,  545,  554,     Gov.  Brooks. 


8 


"prepossess"  and  occupy  it  himself,  (i.)  It  was  a  wise  thing  to  do: 
for  a  strong  work  on  the  highest  point  of  the  peninsula  would 
give  the  Americans  such  a  foothold  there  as  would  not  only  bar  the 
Neck  to  the  passage  of  the  British,  but  would  also  enable  the  besie 
gers  at  a  future  time  to  make  such  siege  approaches  to  Boston  as 
would  render  its  continued  occupation  by  the  enemy  dangerous,  if 
not  impossible.  It  was  a  pretty  safe  thing  to  do  :  for  the  summit 
of  the  hill  was  remote  from  the  battery  on  Copp's  Hill,  and  from 
the  deep  water  required  to  float  the  men-of-war ;  and  it  was  too 
high  to  permit  of  such  elevation  of  guns  from  the  floating  batter 
ies  as  would  seriously  endanger  the  work  or  its  defenders,  while 
the  formation  of  the  ground  was  such  as  to  make  it  easily  defensi 
ble  against  any  land  attack. 

The  council  of  war  which  was  assembled  (June  15)  to  act 
upon  the  recommendation  of  the  Committee  of  Safety,  resulted  in 
the  order  for  the  parade  of  Frye's,  Prescott's  and  Bridge's  regi 
ments,  at  six  o'clock  the  same  evening,  "  with  all  the  intrenching 
tools  in  this  encampment."  (2.)  From  these  three  regiments  a 
thousand  men  were  detached,  to  be  commanded  by  Colonel  Pres- 
cott,  who  had  orders  in  writing  from  General  Ward  to  proceed  that 
evening  to  Bunker's  Hill,  build  fortifications  to  be  planned  by  Colo 
nel  Richard  Gridley,  the  chief  engineer,  and  defend  them  until  he 
should  be  relieved.  (3.)  This  order  did  not  contemplate  a  battle, 
nor  did  the  supply  of  ammunition  or  rations  indicate  any  intention 
beyond  what  appeared  on  the  face  of  the  order,  namely:  the 
outfit  and  defence  of  a  working  party,  which  within  twenty-four 
hours  was  to  be  relieved  by  a  garrison  detachment.  (4.)  The 

1.  Letter  of  Samuel  Gray  to  Mr.  Dyer,  July  12,  1775.     "  On  Friday  a  reso 
lution  was  suddenly  taken  to  intrench  the  night  following." 

Narrative  of  the  Committee  of  Safety,  July  25,  1775. 

Massachusetts  Provincial  Congress  to  Continental  Congress.  American 
Archives.  Committee  of  Safety,  June  15,  "Resolved  unanimously  that  it  be 
recommended  to  the  Council  of  War  that  the  above-mentioned  Bunker's  Hill 
be  maintained  by  sufficient  force  being  posted  there,"  &c.,  &c.  —  Journal  of 
Provincial  Congress,  p.  569. 

2.  Fenno's  Orderly  Book,  June  1(5. 

3.  Judge  Prescott's  Memoirs. 

4.  Hon.  Win.  Prescott's  Ms.,  quoted  in  Butler's  Groton,  &c.,  p.  337,  says 
the  order  of  Ward  to  Prescott  stated  "that  the  party  should  be  relieved  the  next 


9 


number  of  men  assigned  to  the  duty  was  sufficient  to  do  the  work, 
and  no  more  than  sufficient,  and  was  probably  determined  by  the 
limited  supply  of  intrenching  tools. 

Colonel  Prescott  was  no  doubt  selected  to  command  the  expe 
dition  as  being  one  who  favored  it  in  the  council,  who  was 
mature  in  years  and  judgment,  and  who,  in  the  campaign  at 
Cape  Breton,  had  proved  himself  to  be  not  only  courageous  but 
cautious.  Military  ideas  then-a-days  were  crude  among  the  Pro 
vincials,  although  they  would  seem  to  have  been  less  dim  upon 
the  subject  of  precedence  in  rank  and  command  than  in  due 
deference  to  orders.  Instead  of  detailing  three  of  the  oldest 
Massachusetts  regiments  entire,  in  which  case  Colonel  Frye  would 
seem  to  have  been  by  some  six  days  the  ranking  officer,  (i.)  a 
detachment  comprising  the  bulk  of  each  battalion  (and  apparently 
every  field  officer  except  Colonel  Frye)  was  ordered  to  report  to 
Colonel  Prescott.  The  attack  of  gout  which  afflicted  Colonel 
Frye  may  have  been  a  military  u  indisposition  "  apropos  to  the  del 
icate  overslaugh,  but  it  is  to  his  credit  that,  if  so,  it  did  not 
prevent  his  joining  and  acting  with  his  regiment,  under  Prescott, 
when  he  found  the  next  day  that  the  detail  for  fatigue  duty  was 
likely  to  become  a  fighting  brigade. 

One  or  two  hundred  men  of  the  Connecticut  line  accompanied 
the  party,  and  served  with  it,  (2.)  no  doubt  by  order  of  General 
Putnam,  who  was  the  only  officer  competent  to  make  the  detail 
in  the  absence  of  General  Spencer,  the  senior  Brigadier  from 
Connecticut,  whose  station  was  near  Roxbury ;  and  the  coopera 
tion  of  this  body  was  the  only  excuse  for  the  presence  of  General 
Putnam  with  the  party  at  any  time. 

These  1200  men  composed  the  expedition,  which,  led  by  Col. 
Prescott,  left  Cambridge  in  the  evening  of  the  i6th,  marched  over 


morning;"  also,  that  in  the  morning  the  officers  urged  Colonel  Prescott  to  send 
to  headquarters  to  request  the  commander  "to  relieve  them  according  to  his 
engagement,  as  they  had  brought  no  provisions  for  a  longer  time,  and  had 
worked  all  night.  This  he  refused."  *  *  * 

1.  Frye's  regiment  \vas  commissioned  May  'JO,  177f>;  Prescott's,  May  2H; 
Bridges,  May  27.  — ,lonni«l  <>/  /Vo/'mcia/  fom/rt.^. 

'J.  Captain  Chester's  letter. 


10 


Charlestown  Neck,  and  halted  on  the  farther  side.  There  the 
order  was  communicated.  Its  terms  were  clear  and  explicit,  to 
proceed  to  Bunker's  Hill  and  build  fortifications.  The  ground  had 
been  reconnoitred  a  month  before,  by  a  joint  Committee  of  the 
civil  and  military  authorities  of  the  Province,  who  recommended 
the  construction  of  a  strong  redoubt  on  Bunker's  Hill,  with  cannon 
planted  there  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  any  sally  of  the  British 
in  that  quarter,  (i.)  The  name  described  a  specific  locality, 
already  occupied  by  the  Provincial  pickets  —  and  hence  the  recom 
mendation  of  the  Committee  of  Safety,  upon  which  the  command 
ing  General  acted,  spoke  of  Bunker's  Hill  as  a  position  to  be 
"kept,"  "defended,"  "maintained;"  while  of  Dorchester  Hill, 
which  was  not  within  their  lines,  the  same  paper  advised  that 
possession  be  "secured."  (2.) 

After  the  action,  the  same  Committee  describes  the  field  of 
battle,  and  the  site  of  the  redoubt,  as  Breed's  Hill,  and  says  it  was 
chosen  by  some  mistake.  (3.)  It  was  no  mistake  of  the  Com 
mittee — they  recognized  Bunker's  Hill  as  "a  promontory  (?)  just 
at  the  entrance  of  the  peninsula  at  Charlestown,"  and  say  that 
it  was  determined,  with  the  advice  of  this  Committee,  to  send  a 
party  to  fortify  "the  said  hill."  They  quote  the  order  given  as 
one  "  to  intrench  upon  that  hill,"  and  distinctly  declare  the  fortifica 
tion  of  Breed's  to  have  occurred  by  some  mistake.  It  was  not  the 
mistake  of  General  Ward,  who  by  written  orders  defined  the  place 
as  Bunker's  Hill.  It  was  probably  no  mistake  of  Colonel  Pres- 
cott,  who  halted  at  the  foot  of  Bunker's,  read  his  orders  and  acted 
upon  them.  He  detached  there  Captain  Nutting,  with  some  sixty 
men,  to  picket  Charlestown  and  the  shore  opposite  Copp's  Hill ; 
(4.)  and  while  they  took  the  lower  and  direct  route  to  then 
stations,  Prescott,  with  the  main  body,  ascended  the  slope  of 
Bunker's  Hill  to  its  summit,  the  place  where  the  redoubt  should 
have  been  built.  Here  they  were  joined  by  the  engineer,  Colonel 

1.  Records  of  Provincial  Congress. 

2.  Kecords  of  Provincial  Congress. 

3.  Narrative  of  Committee  of  Safety. 

4.  Abel    Parker's    Statement  in   "Yankee"  newspaper,  1818.      He  was  a 
soldier  in  Nutting's  company. 


11 


Gridley,  by  General  Putnam,  and  possibly  by  another  General, 
(i.)  and  here  for  a  time  the  officer  to  whom  the  command  had 
been  entrusted  debated  with  several  others  as  to  the  execution  of 
written  orders  from  his  and  their  superior. 

When  an  officer  is  directed  to  fortify  a  hill,  it  means  that  his 
fortification  is  to  include  the  summit  of  that  hill.  Prescott  knew 
-this,  for  under  the  orders  he  marched  to  the  proper  point,  and 
apparently  but  for  officious  interference  would  have  built  his 
redoubt  on  Bunker's  Hill.  If  he  had  originally  intended  to  go  on 
to  Breed's  Hill,  he  would  not  have  detached  Nutting  at  the  Neck, 
nor  would  he  have  marched  over  the  summit;  but  would  for  nearly 
a  mile  have  followed  the  easier  route  which  Nutting  did  follow, 
and  would  have  diverged  from  it  at  a  point  nearer  to  his  destina 
tion.  Whether  it  was  by  error  in  judgment,  or  by  intentional 
deviation,  that  the  site  of  fortification  was  fixed  at  a  lower  level 
and  nearer  to  Boston  than  the  orders  prescribed,  the  result  was  to 
change  the  whole  character  of  the  expedition.  It  was  no  longer 
a  mere  advance  of  the  line  of  the  intrenchments,  or  the  fortifica 
tion  of  a  picket-post  upon  the  existing  line,  but  the  construction 
of  a  detached  work  midway  between  the  two  armies,  difficult  of 
support  or  defence,  and  such  a  menace  to  the  British  army  in 
Boston  as  to  make  the  immediate  capture  of  the  works  on  their 
part  a  duty  and  a  necessity.  (2.) 

It  is  impossible  carefully  to  read  the  story  of  this  iyth  day  of 
June,  as  told  by  documents  and  witnesses  of  the  time,  without  reach 
ing  the  conviction  that  a  serious  engagement  was  neither  intended 
nor  expected,  as  the  result  of  the  intrenching  expedition.  General 
Ward,  the  chief  military  officer,  and  General  Warren,  the  Presi- 


1.  Gray's  letter.     It  would  be  difficult  to  name  any  general  except  Putnam 
who  would  be  likely  to  be  there.     It  certainly  was  not  Ward.     Thomas,  Heath 
and  Spencer,    were  at  Roxbury.     Warren    passed    the  night  at   Watertown. 
Folsom  was  absent.     Pomeroy  was  no  meddler. 

2.  Lieutenant  Clarke's  pamphlet  (quoted  in  a  note,  p.  168,  Siege  of  Boston,) 
states  that  it  was  in  consequence  of  the  firing  of  cannon  from  the  fort  that  Gage 
determined  to  attack  the  redoubt.     Peter  Brown  (1775),  reflecting  perhaps  a 
general  opinion  among  the  men,  says,  "The  danger  we  were  in  when  discovered 
about  5  in  the  morning,  made  us  think  there  was  treachery,  and  that  we  were 
brought  there  to  be  slain." 


12 


dent  of  the  Provincial  Congress,  were  opposed  to  any  movement 
likely  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement,  (as  well  they  might  be, 
knowing  that  their  magazine  contained  less  than  1500  Ibs.  of 
powder,)  (i.)  and  the  carefully  worded  and  written  order  of  the 
General  limited  the  objective  to  such  an  advance  of  the  trenches 
as  would  effect  precisely  what  was  desired  by  the  Committee  of 
Safety,  namely:  preventing  a  sally  in  that  quarter,  and  yet  which 
would  not  encourage,  much  less  invite  or  compel,  an  immediate 
attack  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  No  general  of  Ward's  acknowl 
edged  prudence  would  have  sent  out  a  party,  intending  that  they 
should  labor  all  night  and  fight  a  pitched  battle  the  next  day,  with 
out  support.  Yet  neither  Ward  nor  Putnam  made  any  seasonable 
provision  for  reinforcements,  except  for  a  company  of  artillery  to 
arm  and  man  the  fort.  The  orderly  books  show  no  provision  for 
moving  other  troops.  Stark  was  obliged,  on  the  iyth,  after  receiv 
ing  his  orders,  to  lose  two  or  three  hours  in  providing  and  preparing 
ammunition,  before  he  could  move  his  regiment  to  Prescott's 
support;  and  he  went  into  the  fight  with  only  fifteen  rounds  of 
ammunition.  (2.)  Captain  Chester,  of  the  Connecticut  line,  "was 
walking  out  from  his  lodgings  just  after  dinner,  (3.)  quite  calm  and 
composed,  and  all  at  once  the  drums  beat  to  arms  and  bells 
rang,"  and  Captain  Putnam  rode  by  at  full  gallop,  bearing  his 
father's  orders  to  march  immediately  to  Bunker's  Hill  to  oppose 
the  enemy;  and  these  Connecticut  troops,  General  Putnam's 
own  command,  arrived  only  near  the  close  of  the  battle,  fully 
three  hours  later.  Of  course  if  an  action  had  been  anticipated, 
both  Ward  and  Putnam  would  have  had  reinforcing  parties  ready 
organized,  armed,  equipped  and  supplied,  at  an  early  hour  of  trie 
morning.  The  first  detachment  of  200  men  from  Stark  was  prob- 


1.  Committee  of  Supplies  to  Committee  of  Safety,  June  17,  1775.  —  "  We 
are  sensibly  concerned  for  the  expenditure  of  powder;  and  as  any  great  con 
sumption  by  cannon  may  be  ruinous  on  our  side,  we  think  it  proper  to  inform 
you  that,  exclusive  of  36  half  barrels  received  from  the  Governor  and  Council 
of  Connecticut  [reserved  for  Connecticut  army],  there  is  only  27  half  barrels  in 
the  magazine." — Journal  of  Provincial  Congress,  p.  570. 

2.  General   Dearborn's  statement,  1818.     Authorities  of  this  date  must  be 
received  with  caution. 

3.  Probably  between  one  and  two  o'clock.     The  regulars  were  then  landing. 


13 


ably  intended  as  the  promised  relief  for  Prescott,  and  the  garrison 
of  his  fort,  then  supposed  to  be  on  Bunker's  Hill. 

It  may  well  be  doubted  whether  Gen.  Ward  realized  the  extent 
of  Prescott's  variation  from  his  orders,  until  Maj.  Brooks  reached 
him,  at  or  near  10  o'clock,  on  the  iyth  ;  until  which  time,  at  least, 
he  considered  it  more  probable  that  the  attack  would  be  made 
upon  his  own  unfortified  position,  at  Cambridge.  Then  he  saw 
the  gravity  of  the  situation,  and  hurried  forward  Stark  with  the 
remainder  of  his  regiment;  (i.)  and,  as  the  intentions  of  the  enemy 
developed,  he  ordered  on  all  of  his  disposable  force,  assembling 
them  by  beat  of  drums  and  ringing  of  bells,  as  if  it  were  a  case 
of  unforeseen  attack. 

These  troops,  unbrigaded,  but  half  equipped  and  not  half 
supplied  with  ammunition,  were  with  much  delay  pushed  forward 
in  the  direction  of  Charlestown.  Stark,  with  his  command,  and 
Reed's  (N.  H.),  which  was  stationed  at  the  Neck,  arrived  in  good 
order  and  did  good  service ;  but,  what  with  the  haste  and  con 
fusion  of  the  march,  the  effect  of  mid-day  heat  on  raw  troops  so 
circumstanced,  and  the  raking  fire  at  the  Neck  from  the  floating 
batteries,  it  is  clear  that  but  a  small  portion  of  the  intended 
reinforcement  actually  reached  the  front,  and  the  few  who,  after 
the  arrival  of  the  New  Hampshire  troops,  actually  came  to  the 
lines,  did  so  in  straggling  parties  and  fell  into  the  ranks  with  those 
who  were  already  in  position  behind  the  defences.  (2.)  With 
them  came  Warren,  Pomeroy  and  Frye,  to  serve  as  volunteers, 
neither  of  them  claiming  authority.  The  enemy  were  advancing  on 


1.  Colonel  Stark  to  Matthew  Thornton,  June  19,   1775:     "Upon    which 
[morning  attack  by  shipping]  I  was  required  by  the  General  to  send  a  party, 
consisting  of  200  men  with  officers,  to  their  assistance;  which  order  I  readily 
obeyed,  and  appointed  and  sent  [Lieut.]  Colonel  Wyinan  commander  of  the 
same.     And  about  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  express  orders  came  for  the  whole 
of  my  regiment  to  proceed  to  Charlestown,  to  oppose  the  enemy  who  were 
landing  on  Charlestown  Point.     Accordingly  we  proceeded,  and  the  battle  soon 
came  on."  —  Provincial  Papers,  N.  H.,  Vol.  VII.  p.  522. 

2.  Captain   Chester's   letter,   1775.     "When   we  arrived  there   was   not  a 
company  with  us  in  any  kind  of  order,  although  when  we  first  set  out,  perhaps 
three  regiments  were  by  our  side." 

Peter  Brown's  letter,  1775,  estimates  reinforcements  at  500  in  all.     William 
Tudor  states  entire  Provincial  force  at  800.      Ri\  ington's  Gazette  says  750  to  S50. 


14 


the  works  ;  the  evident  duty  of  all  was  to  repulse  them,  and  the 
first  need  was  to  inspire  the  troops  with  confidence  to  meet  the 
assault.  Generals  and  Colonels,  as  well  as  their  subalterns,  vied 

I 

with  each  other  in  doing  and  saying  what  would  encourage  the 
men  to  stand  firm,  and  for  the  time  thought  of  no  other  duty  or 
privilege  as  attached  to  their  rank. 

At  the  time  the  British  troops  landed,  the  Provincial  defences 
consisted  only  of  the  redoubt  and  the  flanking  earthwork  on  its 
left,  and  the  whole  of  the  American  force  was  the  original  com 
mand  of  Colonel  Prescott,  minus  the  number  of  those  who,  weary, 
hungry  or  frightened,  had  straggled  to  the  rear,  and  plus  Captain 
Gridley's  section  of  artillery,  and  possibly  the  200  men  of  Stark's 
regiment,  under  Lieut.  Colonel  Wyman. 

To  prevent  the  flanking  of  the  works,  Colonel  Prescott  took 
the  only  possible  course,  namely :  the  detachment  of  flanking 
parties  from  his  own  force.  He  sent  the  artillery,  and  the  Con 
necticut  men  under  Knowlton,  to  operate  on  Howe's  right,  and 
Lieut.  Colonel  Robinson  and  Major  Wood  to  operate  on  the 
enemy's  left.  The  latter  probably  occupied  the  houses  in  Charles- 
town,  causing  such  loss  to  General  Pigot  as  to  seriously  embarrass 
his  advance,  and  to  justify  the  burning  of  the  town. 

Just  as  Knowlton  and  Gridley  issued  from  the  fort,  Stark,  with 
his  two  New  Hampshire  regiments,  came  to  the  summit  of  Bunker's 
Hill.  From  that  position  Stark  could  see  the  British  landing  and 
forming  at  Moulton's  Point  to  the  left,  the  little  group  of  Prescott's 
works  on  Breed's  Hill,  and  the  detachments  issuing  from  it  to  the 
right  and  left.  He  could  see  that  the  great  danger  was  that  the 
British  might  get  into  Prescott's  rear  by  way  of  his  left  flank. 
The  attack  seemed  imminent,  and  he  took  in  with  the  instinct  of  a 
natural  soldier  the  whole  situation,  and  briefly  addressing  his  men, 
led  them  with  cheers  by  a  rapid  movement  down  to  the  foot  of 
Bunker's  Hill,  and  there,  in  a  few  minutes,  extemporized  from  two 
fences  and  the  fresh  mown  grass  an  effective  defence.  Knowlton, 
seeing  this  movement,  imitated  it  on  Stark's  right  in  such  a  man 
ner  as  to  form  a  nearly  connected  line  from  the  redoubt  to  the 
Mystic  river.  Knowlton,  however,  appears  to  have  had  no  grass 


15 


at  hand,  but  he  had  the  advantage  of  a  natural  ditch,  (i.)  The 
defences,  such  as  they  were,  could  hardly  have  been  completed 
when  the  British  made  their  attack. 

There  is  no  proof,  and  it  is  not  probable  that  this  formation 
was  effected  by  order  of  Putnam,  or  of  Prescott.  Its  origin  was 
in  the  soldierly  instinct  of  Stark,  and  it  accomplished  such  pro 
tection  of  the  left  flank  as  Prescott  had  proposed  to  accomplish 
when  he  sent  out  Knowlton  and  Gridley, — and  a  better  protection. 

To  estimate  all  this  properly  there  must  be  kept  in  mind  the 
imminence  of  the  battle,  the  shortness  of  time,  the  excitement  of 
the  action,  and  the  confusion  of  the  succeeding  retreat.  At  such 
times,  and  under  such  circumstances,  minutes  seem  like  hours,  and 
hours  like  minutes,  and  there  are  few  men  who  can  correctly  relate 
their  own  doings,  and  yet  fewer  who  can  describe  what  occurred 
about  them. 

It  is  worthy  of  note,  that  such  works  as  were  that  day  con 
structed  on  Breed's  Hill,  have  been  found  to  be  the  most  practically 
effective  defences  in  modern  warfare. 

Colonel  Prescott,  who  commanded  the  original  party,  and 
whose  men  had  built  the  earthworks,  naturally  continued  to 
exercise  immediate  command  over  all  the  men  at  that,  the  most 
important  point.  Colonel  Stark,  whose  men  had  extemporized 
the  defences  on  the  extreme  left,  as  naturally  commanded  all  who 
were  there.  Captain  Knowlton,  who  with  the  Connecticut  men 
finally  took  position  between  Prescott  and  Stark,  (2.)  may  very 
probably  have  deferred  to  General  Putnam,  who  was  his  regi 
mental  commander.  Each  of  these  officers  —  Prescott,  Stark  and 
Knowlton  —  recognized  the  fact  that  his  was  part  of  a  general 
line,  and  each  did  what  he  could  to  support  those  on  his  flanks  ; 
and,  after  the  action  began,  there  was  no  occasion  to  give  orders 
for  changing  the  general  disposition. 

By  order  of  Major-General  Ward,  Colonel  Prescott  was  origi- 

1.  Chester's  letter  describes  Knowlton's  barricade  quite  particularly.     He 
does  not  speak  of  hay,  but  mentions   the  stone  wall  and   the  natural  ditch, 
neither  of  which  is  described  by  those  in  the  New  Hampshire  line. 

2.  Chester's  letter.     "  We  joined  our  army  (?  Conn,  army)  on  the  right  of 
the  centre." 


16 


nally  assigned  to  the  command,  and  no  older  was  issued  to 
supersede  him.  If  there  had  been  supersession,  it  must  have 
been  by  right  of  rank,  such  as  Prescott  acknowledged  when  he 
saluted  Warren  as  his  general ;  but  Putnam  had  no  rank  in  the 
army  of  Massachusetts,  and  could  not  command  Massachusetts 
troops  on  Massachusetts  soil,  except  by  virtue  of  a  positive  order 
from  the  Commanding  General  of  Massachusetts,  if  indeed  he 
could  even  in  that  case. 

Colonel  Prescott  led  the  column  to  Charlestown,  and  directed 
the  men  engaged  in  constructing  the  earthworks.  He  detached 
pickets,  composed  in  part  of  Connecticut  troops,  visited  them 
personally  during  the  night,  and  recalled  them  in  the  morning. 
When  the  British  were  landing,  he  ordered  Captain  Gridley  with 
his  battery  to  go  out  and  oppose  them,  and  Captain  Knowlton 
with  the  Connecticut  men  to  support  Gridley.  (i.)  He  also  sent 
Colonel  Robinson  and  Major  Wood  to  operate  on  the  left  of  Pigot 
as  he  advanced,  and  thus  actually  exercised  the  attributes  of  chief 
commander  night  and  day,  not  only  in  the  redoubt,  but  outside, 
and  over  the  whole  front  of  the  Provincial  lines.  When  he  desired 
to  communicate  with  his  commanding  general,  and  to  obtain  men 
and  supplies,  he  sent  Major  Brooks  on  foot  to  General  Ward  at 
Cambridge,  (2.)  which  he  would  not  have  done  had  there  been 
any  intermediate  commander ;  and  Brooks  carried  the  message 
through  to  Ward,  although  he  met  General  Putnam  on  the  way. 

When  General  Warren  appeared  near  the  redoubt,  "  in  the 
time  of  action,"  Prescott  offered  to  surrender  the  command  to 
him,  —  an  offer  which  he  had  no  power  to  make  if  Putnam  was 
his  commander  ;  and  the  reply  of  General  Warren,  who  was  not 
only  the  ranking  officer  on  the  field,  but  was  also  the  President  of 
Congress  and  a  member  of  the  Executive  body  of  the  Province, 
was  explicit  and  distinct :  "The  command  is  yours."  (3.) 


1.  Colonel  Prescott's  letter,  \7i->,  to  John  Adams.     Chester's  letter. 

"2.  Governor  Brooks'  statement. 

•>.  "In  the  time  of  action,  Colonel  Prescott,  observing  that  the  brave 
General  Warren  was  near  the  works,  he  immediately  stepped  up  to  him  and 
asked  him  if  he  had  any  orders  to  give  him.  The  General  replied  that  he  had 
none,  that  he  exercised  no  command  there.  'The  command,'  said  the  General, 
f  is  yours.'  "  —  IIv(<lli'x  Menmirs.. 


IT 


Of  those  to  whom  the  honor  of  the  command  has  been 
ascribed,  Prescott  and  he  only  was  present  from  the  first  step  of 
the  march  to  the  last  gun  of  the  battle.  The  engineer,  worn  out, 
forsook  him  —  one  regimental  commander  wounded,  and  one  sick, 
could  render  him  but  little  service,  and  the  most  of  their  men, 
exhausted  with  labor  and  fasting,  had  deserted  the  party  —  but 
upon  Prescott  was  the  burden  of  command.  For  him  to  falter, 
was  defeat  and  disgrace  to  the  patriot  cause.  As  his  subalterns 
succumbed  to  adverse  circumstances,  his  zeal  and  confidence 
increased  and  strengthened.  He  would  not  ask  for  the  promised 
relief,  but  only  for  food  and  reinforcement.  When  his  raw  soldiers 
hesitated  in  their  work,  under  the  fire  of  the  British  artillery,  he 
mounted  the  earthwork,  and,  all  exposed  from  head  to  foot,  paced 
the  parapet,  and  quietly  continued  his  supervision  of  their  work. 
The  Americans  who  fought  outside  of  the  redoubt,  fought  in  aid 
of  and  subsidiary  to  the  defence  of  the  fort  where  Prescott  had 
statioried  himself;  and  when  he  gave  the  order  to  retreat  —  an 
order  which  the  Committee  of  Safety  expressly  state  was  given 
by  "  the  Commander  of  the  party,"  the  battle  was  decided,  and  by 
that  order  its  issue  was  declared.  Upon  leaving  the  peninsula, 
Colonel  Prescott  at  once  repaired  to  Cambridge  and  reported  to 
General  Ward,  (i.)  as  a  commanding  officer  should  report  to  his 
immediate  superior,  and  asked  of  him  a  new  command  of  fresh 
men,  proposing  with  them  to  retake  Bunker's  Hill,  and  to  fortify 
and  hold  it  as  General  Ward  had  originally  directed  him  to  do. 

The  result  of  the  action  was  the  defeat  of  the  Provincials. 
Instead  of  converting  their  advanced  picket  at  Bunker's  Hill  into 
a  fortified  post,  and  thus  getting  absolute  control  of  that  outlet 
from  Boston — which  was  the  object  and  intent  of  the  expedition, — 
the  Americans  had  been  driven  from  the  position  which  they  forti- 

1.  "On  his  return  to  Cambridge  he  immediately  repaired  to  headquarters, 
where  he  found  the  commander  in  chief  in  great  distress,  apprehensive  that  the 
enemy,  encouraged  by  their  success,  might  advance  on  Cambridge  and  attempt 
to  penetrate  into  the  country.  Colonel  Prescott  assured  him  that  the  enemy's 
confidence  would  not  be  increased  by  the  result  of  the  action,  and  offered  to 
retake  the  heights  that  night  or  perish  in  the  attempt,  if  the  commander  in  chief 
would  give  him  three  regiments,  with  bayonets  and  sufficient  ammunition." 

—  Histon/  of  Groton,  p.  338, 

3 


18 


fied  and  had  lost  the  whole  peninsula.  In  the  days  immediately 
following  that  of  the  battle,  certainly,  and  probably  for  many 
months  thereafter,  the  Provincial  authorities  were  inclined  to  speak 
in  apologetic  terms  of  the  action.  The  Committee  of  Safety 
evidently  ascribed  the  defeat  to  the  mistake  in  proceeding  beyond 
their  lines  to  Breed's  Hill,  (i.)  Mr.  David  Cheever  ascribes  it 
to  the  want  of  supplies  and  the  shortness  of  time;  (2.)  and  the 
recriminations  among  the  officers  found  vent  in  courts  of  enquiry 
and  courts-martial.  When  Colonel  Prescott,  in  August,  wrote  an 
account  of  the  battle,  in  a  letter  to  John  Adams,  he  takes  occasion 
to  say  that  he  was  ordered  to  intrench  on  Breed's  Hill,  and  speaks 
in  tones  of  complaint  of  the  weakness  of  his  subalterns,  but  he 
does  not  shirk  the  responsibility  of  the  command. 

Colonel  Scamman  testified  that  no  general  officer  commanded 
on  Bunker's  Hill.  John  Pitts,  a  member  of  the  Provincial  Con 
gress,  wrote  to  Samuel  Adams,  within  six  weeks  of  the  date  of  the 
battle,  that  no  one  appeared  to  have  any  command  but  Colonel 
Prescott.  Peter  Thacher,  who  drafted  for  the  Committee  of  Safety 
the  official  narrative  of  the  battle,  expressly  declares  that  Prescott 
commanded  the  Provincials ;  (3.)  and  General  Ward,  whose 
testimony  alone  ought  to  be  conclusive,  wrote  to  John  Adams, 
October,  3oth,  1775,  "  I  think  there  has  been  no  one  action  with 
the  enemy  which  has  not  been  conducted  by  an  officer  of  this 
colony  (Massachusetts),  except  that  at  Chelsea,  which  was  con 
ducted  by  General  Putnam/'  At  which  last,  by  the  way,  Dr. 
Warren,  the  President  of  the  Provincial  Congress,  was  also  present 
in  person,  and  Putnam  may  therefore  have  been  acting  by  special 
delegation  from  the  civil  authority. 

General  Putnam  appears  to  have  been  a  nervously  active  man, 
with  plenty  of  personal  courage,  —  one  to  whom  constant  motion 
was  almost  a  necessity,  and  whose  self-confidence  inclined  him  to 


1.  Letter  of  Provincial   Congress   to  Continental  Congress,  June  20,  1775, 
closes,  "  If  any  error  was  committed  on  our  side,  it  was  in  taking  a  post  so  much 
exposed." 

2.  David  Cheever  to  New  Hampshire  Congress:  "New  England  forces  wrere 
improvided,  by  the  shortness  of  time,  for  such  an  attack." 

3.  Cited  in    "Siege  of   Boston,"  from  Ms.   in   possession  of  Am.   Antiq. 
Society,  "Worcester. 


li) 


meddle  with  whatever  was  afoot  in  the  army,  —  but  of  little 
military  skill.  If,  as  is  very  likely,  it  was  his  urgent  advice  that 
induced  Prescott  to  deviate  from  his  orders,  he  must  have  felt  a 
peculiar  responsibility  for  the  result,  and  he  evidently  did  what 
he  could  to  rectify  the  error ;  but  it  was  too  late.  He  was  very 
earnest  in  his  applications  to  officers  and  men  to  move  the 
intrenching  tools  back  to  Bunker's  Hill;  (i.)  and  he  made  great 
exertions,  not  only  to  reinforce  or  otherwise  assist  the  battle-line, 
but  also  to  get  the  men,  as  tftey  straggled  by  from  front  and  rear, 
to  work  upon  a  redoubt  at  the  summit  of  the  hill.  Nothing  more 
clearly  demonstrates  the  fact  that  he  was  not  on  duty  on  his  rank 
than  the  small  measure  of  success  that  attended  his  efforts.  One 
of  the  few,  if  not  the  only  one  of  the  officers  who  was  mounted, 
he  was  for  that  reason  able  to  pass  frequently  from  front  to  rear ; 
and  did  so,  going  back  two  or  three  times  as  far  as  Cambridge. 

A  general  commanding  a  detached  party,  especially  on  the 
eve  of  battle,  does  not  abandon  the  field,  personally  to  ask  for 
reinforcements,  or  hasten  forward  supplies,  or  to  give  orders  for 
turning  out  troops  not  included  in  the  detatchment :  as  General 
Putnam  is  said  to  have  done.  (2.)  Colonel  Putnam's  account  in 
1825  (not  very  good  authority),  states  that  General  Putnam  was  at 
Cambridge  when  the  cannonade  began  (about  sunrise)  ;  Major 
Brooks  saw  him  between  nine  and  ten,  riding  from  Cambridge 
toward  Charlestown ;  and  again  between  one  and  two,  while  the 
British  were  actually  crossing,  Captain  Trevett  saw  him  going  to 
and  returning  from  Cambridge. 

As  a  mounted  officer  and  one  whose  person  and  rank  were 
well  known,  he  would  be  and  was  asked  by  new-comers  as  to  the 
direction  to  be  taken  by  them.  But,  excepting  as  any  unattached 
officer  might  and  naturally  would,  in  time  of  battle,  give  orders  to 
further  the  purposes  of  the  action,  it  does  not  appear  that  he 

1.  Heath's  Memoirs,  1798.    Dr.  Kittredge's  letter,  1818. 

2.  Col.  Daniel  Putnam's  letter,    1825.     Captain  Trevett,    1818.     Governor 
Brooks'  statement.     Rev.  Ezra  Stiles  Diary,  1775,  quoted  in  "  Siege  of  Boston." 
"  Putnam  was  not  on  Bunker's  Hill  at  the  beginning,  but  soon  repaired  thither, 
and  was  in  the  heat  of  the  action  till  towards  night,  when  he  went  away  to 
fetch  reinforcements,  and  before  he  could  return  our  men  began  to  retreat  " 


20 


assumed  any  command  beyond  the  men  of  his  own  regiment  and 
province'.     If  he  did,  he  was  not  obeyed. 

The  news  of  the  battle  of  Bunker's  Hill  reached  the  Conecti- 
cut  Committee  of  Safety  on  the  i8th  of  June,  at  10  o'clock  in  the 
evening.  On  the  igth  the  Committee  advised  the  Governor  to 
give  orders  to  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  Connecticut  to  yield 
obedience  to  the  general  commanding  officer  of  the  troops  of 
Massachusetts,  while  acting  in  that  province ;  and  on  the  2oth 
such  orders  were  issued,  (i.)  This  action,  by  its  date  and  its 
precipitancy,  would  seem  to  be  suggestive  of  some  serious  and 
recent  experience  of  conflicting  authority  in  Massachusetts,  and 
to  make  it  absolutely  certain  that  previous  to  that  time,  although 
General  Ward  might  as  a  matter  of  courtesy  between  allies  invite 
Putnam  to  his  council  of  war,  he  could  not  command  him  or  his 
troops ;  and  however  welcome  might  be  his  presence  on  any  field 
of  action,  there  was  certainly  too  much  intercolonial  jealousy  (2.) 
to  make  it  prudent,  perhaps  even  possible,  to  place  him  in  impor 
tant  command  over  the  best  regiments  of  Massachusetts,  much 
less  to  supersede  by  such  an  appointment  a  trusted  and  veteran 
officer  of  the  Province. 

Happily,  on  the  very  day  of  the  battle,  Congress  commissioned 
a  commander  over  the  troops  of  all  the  Provinces ;  and  the  roar 
of  the  conflict  on  that  hillside  was  the  grand  salute  in  honor  of 
the  General  in-Chief  of  the  Army  of  Independence.  But  while 
we  yet  linger  among  the  centennial  anniversaries  of  the  Provincial 
uprisings,  let  us  carefully  do  justice  to  the  heroes  of  those  earlier 
days ;  and  it  is  claimed  that  history,  carefully  examined,  establishes 
the  following  points : 

First.  That  the  occurrence  of  the  action  on  the  peninsula  of 
Charlestown  was  an  unexpected  event,  and  one  for  which  no  real 
provision  had  been  made. 

Second.  That  the  cause  of  the  action  was  in  the  deviation  from 
Ward's  orders  to  Prescott,  and  in  selecting  a  position  "  too  much 
exposed." 

Third.     That  after  the  "  mistake  "  had  been  made,  and  when 


1.  Am.  Archives. 

"2    See  Washington's  General  Order  of  July  4,  1775. 


21 


a  battle  became  inevitable,  Colonel  Prescott  was  reinforced,  but 
never  superseded. 

Fourth.  That  General  Putnam,  owing  no  obedience  to  the 
commanding  general,  and  having  no  claim  to  rank  in  the  Massa 
chusetts  army,  could  not  have  commanded  Massachusetts  soldiers 
on  Massachusetts  soil. 

Fifth.  That  Colonel  Prescott,  who  commanded  at  the  redoubt 
the  key  of  the  position,  to  obtain  or  retain  possession  of  which 
was  the  sole  object  of  the  battle,  was  the  superior  military  com 
mander  in  the  action. 


NOTE. 

There  has  been  a  single  attempt  to  prove  Putnam  commanding  within  the 
redoubt.  It  originated  in  a  story  purporting  to  have  been  told  by  Colonel  Small, 
who  commanded  a  detachment  of  Marines  in  the  battle,  and  who  is  reported  to 
have  said  that  when  the  British  troops  advanced  the  second  time  to  the  attack 
on  the  redoubt,  he,  with  other  officers,  was  in  front  of  the  line  to  encourage  the 
men;  that  when  very  near  the  works  there  came  an  irregular  fire  which  was 
cruelly  fatal ;  the  troops  fell  back  —  he  looked  to  the  right  and  left,  and  saw  not 
one  officer  standing  —  glanced  his  eye  to  the  enemy  and  saw  several  young  men 
levelling  their  pieces  at  him,  and  considered  himself  gone.  "At  that  moment 
my  old  friend  Putnam  rushed  forward,  and  striking  up  the  muzzles  of  their 
pieces  with  his  sword,  cried  out,  'For  God's  sake,  my  lads,  don't  fire  at  that 
man!  I  love  him  as  I  do  my  brother! '  He  was  obeyed;  I  bowed,  thanked  him, 
and  walked  away  unmolested.'' 

The  story  fails  as  proof  — 

First.  Because  the  language  used  by  Putnam  is  that  of  supplication  —  of 
entreaty  —  not  of  command. 

Second,  There  is  nothing  else  in  all  the  various  accounts  of  the  battle 
leading  to  a  supposition  that  Putnam  was  within  the  redoubt  during  the  time  of 
the  battle.  It  can  hardly  be  supposed  that  Putnam  was  there  merely  for  the 
purpose  of  saving  Small,  yet  he  is  not  shown  by  any  one  to  have  done  anything 
else  there. 

Third.  The  tale  is  so  utterly  incredible  that  it  carries  on  its  face  its  own 
refutation.  The  "  several  young  men"  would  hardly  have  been  long  enoiigh  in 
taking  sight  at  an  object  so  near  (even  if  it  was  Small)  to  give  time  for  any  one 
to  knock  up  their  guns;  and  there  must  have  been  several  other  young  men 
there,  out  of  the  reach  of  Putnam's  sword,  who  did  not  love  Small. 

The  story  presents  a  fine  stage  scene,  but  the  Provincials  in  that  action 
were  "  terribly  in  earnest,"  and  were  rehearsing  no  drama.  It  may  do  to  "  tell 
to  the  marines,"  of  which  force  Colonel  Small  must  have  been  an  honored  com 
mander,  but  it  is  not  of  such  stuff  that  history  is  made. 


Printed  by 

WARREN  RICHARDSON, 

256  Washington  St. 

Boston. 


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